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Abstract: The operating procedure of a central bank influences in no small measure whether 
the behavior of interest rates is consistent with the expectations hypothesis. In New Zealand, 
the predictive content of the term spread improves markedly in the wake of the switch from a 
quantity-based to a price-based operating procedure in March 1999. The Official Cash Rate 
system has made it easier for market participants to understand the day-to-day conduct of 
monetary policy. As a result, market interest rates have become more predictable, thereby 
contributing to the success of the expectations hypothesis in explaining the behavior of yields 
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In an influential paper, Mankiw & Miron (1986) conjecture that the implementation of 
monetary policy bears on the validity of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of 
interest rates (EHTS). Employing a simple two-period framework, they find supportive 
evidence for the expectations hypothesis in short-term US data before the founding of the 
Federal Reserve in 1915 but none after. In their view, the founding of the Federal Reserve 
had led to a dramatic change in the behavior of interest rates – it had significantly reduced the 
predictability of interest rates – and hence diminished the ability of the term spread to predict 
future changes in short term interest rates.
 Mankiw and Miron’s findings have not gone 
unchallenged.
1 For example, Kool & Thornton (2004) argue that the econometric 
methodology employed by Mankiw and Miron tends to generate supportive results for the 
expectations hypothesis during periods when short-term interest rates are relatively more 
volatile than long-term interest rates. They also argued that the EHTS receives more support 
when the term spread is negative, i.e. when the yield curve is inverted.
  
In this paper, we test the expectations hypothesis on New Zealand data. Our approach is by 
and large the same as Mankiw and Miron’s (1986). We test the empirical validity of the 
theory at the short end of the maturity spectrum, using 30-day and 60-day and 90-day and 
180-day bank bill rates, respectively, in a two-period framework. The sample period begins in 
the late 1980s and ends midway through 2008 before the collapse of Lehman Brothers rattled 
financial markets the world over. Central to our analysis is the occurrence of a substantive 
change in the operating procedure of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in March 1999. At 
the time, the Reserve Bank realized the need to switch from a quantity-based to a price-based 
operating procedure in an effort to make the conduct of monetary policy more efficient, 
transparent, and predictable. By international standards the volatility of market interest rates 
had become unacceptably high under the quantity-based operating scheme and therefore 
compromised the Reserve Bank’s ability to communicate its intentions effectively to 
financial market participants. We show that the switch to the Official Cash Rate (OCR) 
system made market interest rates more predictable. More importantly, we find more 
evidence in support of the expectations hypothesis in the OCR period. The ability of the term 
                                                           
1 Some of the criticism is actually leveled against a companion paper. Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (MMW) (1987) 
claim that the founding of the Fed fundamentally changed the behavior of short term interest rates in the United 
States. Fishe and Wohar (1990) question the reliability of the data used in the study and challenge MMW’s 
finding that the structural break in the 180-day rate coincided with the founding of the Fed. Examining the 
behavior of short-term interest rates around the time the Fed was created, Angelini (1994) finds no evidence for 
a regime change. In their reply, MMW (1994) point to the low power of the test employed by Angelini.   3 
 
spread to predict changes in the short term interest rate improved markedly after the adoption 
of the OCR system. Our findings thus confirm the connection between the operating 
procedure, which affects the predictability of interest rates, and the empirical validity of the 
expectations hypothesis.
2  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the gist of the expectations 
hypothesis. Section III describes the operating procedure before and after March 1999. 
Section IV presents the empirical findings. Section V concludes. 
 
II. The Basic Model 
This section briefly reviews the expectations hypothesis of term structure in a simple two-
period model. Let rt and Rt be the one-period and two-period bank bill rate, respectively. The 





t t t t R r E r       ,               (1) 
where Et defines the expectation formed at time t. Equation (1) describes the arbitrage-free 
condition that the return from investing in a two-period bill equals the expected return from 
investing  sequentially  in  two  one-period  bills,  plus  a  constant  term  premium  θ.  Rewrite 
Equation (1) as 
1 2 2( ) t t t t t E r r R r        .              (2) 
The  term  spread  between  the  long  rate  and  the  short  rate  should  reflect  the  market’s 
prediction  about  future  movements  in  short-term  interest  rates.  Assuming  that  market 
forecasts are correct on average, the future short rate equals the sum of the expectation and a 
forecast error: 
1 1 1 t t t t r E r v     ,                 (3) 
                                                           
2 In an earlier study of the expectations hypothesis covering only the pre-OCR period, Guthrie, Wright and Yu 
(1999) report that the theory describes the behavior of interest rates in New Zealand reasonably well, at least in 
comparison with the United States. They conjecture that the success of the expectations hypothesis in New 
Zealand is a direct consequence of the Reserve Bank’s manipulation of short-term interest rates over the 1989-
1998 period. Because short term interest rates were far more predictable in New Zealand compared to the 
United States, the expectations hypothesis describes the behavior of short-term interest rates better in New 
Zealand than in the United States. This is essentially the argument advanced by Mankiw and Miron (1986), 
Rudebusch (1995), and McCallum (2005).  4 
 
where vt+1 is orthogonal to information available at time t.  
To  set  up  the  conventional  test  of  the  expectations  theory,  substitute  (3)  into  (2)  and 
parameterize the equation as 
11 () t t t t t r r R r v                      (4) 
For the expectations theory to hold, point estimates of   should not be significantly different 
from two. The null and alternative hypotheses underlying the test are: 
H0:   = 2 and HA:  2                (5) 
For the constant, the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
H0:  2     and HA:  2                 (6) 
   
We test examine the predictive ability of the term spread using yields on New Zealand bank 
bills. Bank bills are backed by or issued by commercial banks to raise funds in the wholesale 
money market. They usually have a term to maturity of 30, 60, 90, or 180 days. 90-day bank 
bills are a major source of funding for home mortgages and working capital. The simple two-
period framework allows us to consider two cases. The first case treats the 30-day bank bill 
rate as the short rate and the 60-day bank bill rate as the long rate. The second case treats the 
90-day bank bill rate, which is by far the most watched interest rate in the money market, as 
the short rate and the 180-day as the long rate.  
Given the critical importance of a central bank’s operating procedure in determining the 
validity of the expectations hypothesis in empirical tests, we describe in the next section the 
distinctive features of the two operating procedures which the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
has followed since the 1980s.  
 
III. Operating Procedures 
A.  The Cash Settlement Balances (CSB) System  
The complete overhaul of the monetary policy framework in New Zealand preceded the 
adoption of the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 by about three years. The hallmark of the 
operating procedure by which monetary policy was implemented from 1986 until March 17
th, 5 
 
1999 was an announced target for the supply of cash settlement balances (free reserves in 
circulation at the end of the business day). By its very nature the focus of this operating 
procedure rested squarely on ensuring that the quantity of actual cash settlement balances in 
circulation was roughly in line with the announced target after accounting for all inflow into 
and outflows from the government account. To meet the target for cash settlement balances, 
the Reserve Bank carried out open market operations on a daily basis.  
If conditions warranted a change in monetary policy, the Reserve Bank sought to steer market 
interest rates in the desired direction. To achieve this outcome, the Reserve Bank could either 
change the supply of or affect the demand for cash settlement balances. By changing the 
target for cash settlement balances outright, the Bank was in a position to affect commercial 
banks’ access to cash settlement balances, A larger (smaller) supply of settlement balances 
would lead to lower (higher) overnight interest rates and flow on to other short-term interest 
rates. The Reserve Bank issued its own short-term securities to affect liquidity in the financial 
sector. By varying the supply of these bills, the Reserve Bank sought to influence the demand 
for cash settlement balances.
3 For instance, a reduction in the supply of Reserve Bank bills 
was to make commercial banks bid more aggressively for cash settlement balances in the 
inter-bank market, thereby pushing up short-term interest rates. The two remaining tools to 
affect monetary conditions through the demand for cash settlement balances were the 
discount margin and the payment of interest on cash settlement balances held on deposit at 
the Reserve Bank. By increasing the discount margin, the Reserve Bank made it more costly 
for commercial banks to acquire access to cash settlement balances via the sale of Reserve 
Bank bills. Hence the commercial banks would again bid more vigorously for cash settlement 
balances in the inter-bank market, thereby pushing up short-term interest rates. Raising the 
yield on balances on deposit with the Reserve Bank lowered the opportunity cost of holding 
cash settlement balances and induced commercial banks to step up their demand for 
additional cash balances. Interestingly, the yield on these balances was 65 percent of the yield 
on seven-day bank bills (similar to bank-backed commercial paper), a market-determined 
interest rate!
4  
This operating procedure proved to be wanting in several respects. First and foremost, the 
quantity-based CSB system failed to translate enunciated changes in the stance of monetary 
                                                           
3 These bills were auctioned off twice a week in tenders of NZ$ 70 million each and had a term to maturity of 63 
days. Bills with less than 28 days to maturity could be redeemed for cash settlement balances without penalty. 
4 Starting in December 1991, the deposit rate was changed to the yield on seven-day bank bills less 300 basis 
points. 6 
 
policy to predictable changes in short-term market interest rates. Financial market 
participants found it exceedingly difficult to map an announced change in the target, say a 
reduction of the target by NZ$ 5 million, into the desired change in the most important short 
term interest rate, the 90-day bank bill rate. Was it to bring about a 25 basis point change? Or 
even a 50 basis point change?
5 Because of the absence of a tight link between changes in the 
target for CSB and market interest rates, the Reserve Bank had to communicate its policy 
intentions by way of statements on monetary conditions. Thus monetary policy was factually 
implemented by commenting on whether current market interest rates and the exchange rate 
were at levels commensurate with achieving price stability. For a while, every Wednesday 
the Reserve Bank gave an assessment on the appropriateness of monetary conditions. To 
facilitate communication with financial market participants, the Reserve Bank adopted in the 
mid-1990s a monetary conditions index which served as an operating target in the 
implementation of monetary policy.  
Due to the opaque nature of the way monetary policy was implemented the volatility of short-
term interest rates in New Zealand was exceedingly high by international standards. Table 1 
shows the average absolute daily change in the 90-day bank bill rate in New Zealand was 
nearly six times higher than in the United States, nearly 4 times higher than in Britain, more 
than 2.5 times higher than in Australia and more than 1.5 times higher than in Canada.  
Towards the end of the decade when monetary policy signals were transmitted via the 
monetary conditions index, fluctuations in the 90-day bank bill rate in New Zealand  even 
worsened while they decreased by more than 50 percent in Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. A marked increase in the volatility of the value of the domestic currency 
vis-à-vis the US Dollar, the Japanese Yen, and the German Mark complicated matters further 
during the Asian Currency crisis in 1997 and thereafter.
6 At the time the Reserve Bank 
realized that it could not do much about the ups and downs of the value of the domestic 
currency in the foreign exchange markets. Foreign exchange market intervention was ruled 
out as a policy prescription. Faced with this situation, the Reserve Bank concluded that a 
                                                           
5 The final change of target for cash settlement balances occurred in August 1995, three and a half years prior to 
the introduction of the Official Cash Rate.  The Reserve Bank realized early on that the CSB target operating 
procedure was beset with systemic problems. For instance, given the small size of the financial markets and the 
limited supply of Reserve Bank bills in circulation, there was an incentive for commercial banks to hoard them 
in an attempt to control the cash market. This led to sizeable periodic differences between the overnight cash 
rate and the 90-day bank bill rate. 
6 The standard deviation of changes in the daily exchange rate of the NZ Dollar to the US Dollar over the July 
1996-1999 period increased to 0.0040 from 0.0029 during the 1994- June 1996 period. The standard deviation 
of changes the NZ Dollar/Japanese Yen exchange rate increased from 0.4563 in the 1994-June 1996 period  to 
0.6172  in the July 1996 –Jan 1999 period. For the NZ Dollar/German Mark exchange rate, the standard 
deviation increased from 0.0069 to 0.0086 over the same periods. 7 
 
complete revamp of its operating procedure was necessary to lessen the volatility of short-
term interest rates in the domestic financial market. 
B.  The Official Cash Rate System  
As early as 1996 the Reserve Bank realized the need for switching to a price-based operating 
procedure. However, the decision to guide market expectations about the course of future 
monetary policy with the help of a monetary conditions index delayed the introduction of the 
Official Cash Rate system by a little more than two years. On February 8
th, 1999 the Reserve 
Bank announced that effective March 17
th the implementation of monetary policy in New 
Zealand would revolve around the Official Cash Rate. The Reserve Bank sets the Official 
Cash Rate and reviews its setting six times a year. In essence, the OCR serves two purposes. 
First, it acts as a clear and precise signal for the current stance of monetary policy. In that 
capacity it acts as the benchmark for short-term interest rates in New Zealand. Second, the 
OCR is the instrumental lever in operating the Reserve Bank’s standing facilities. In its 
original conception, the OCR forms the mid-point of a channel for the overnight cash rate in 
the interbank lending market.
7 The Reserve Bank offers to lend (on demand against suitable 
collateral) at a rate of 25 basis points above the announced OCR and agrees to accept deposits 
at a rate of 25 basis points below the OCR. These two interest rates mark the ceiling and floor 
of the corridor within which the overnight cash rate fluctuates. Open-market operations were 
initially the primary tool that the Reserve Bank used to smooth liquidity flows in and out of 
the financial sector. They have become less important in more recent times in the wake of 
attempts by the Reserve Bank to improve the operational efficiency of the OCR system. 
Strains had arisen because of dwindling amounts of outstanding Treasury debt, which serves 
as collateral in open-market operations. To counteract the problem, the Reserve Bank decided 
to increase substantially the volume of cash balances in circulation. In addition, the Reserve 
Bank increasingly relies on foreign exchange swaps to affect liquidity conditions in the 
financial market.  
The OCR system has the advantage that it is transparent, efficient, and easy to understand. By 
setting an interest rate, the Reserve Bank sends a clear signal to the market about the desired 
level of interest rates at the short end of the maturity spectrum of the yield curve. The OCR 
system allows expectations about the future course of monetary policy to affect current 
                                                           
7  In June 2006 the Reserve Bank made a few modifications to the OCR system. Under the new arrangement, the 
OCR forms the floor of a 50 basis-point corridor. The cost of borrowing funds from the bank has increased to 
OCR +50 basis points and funds deposited at RBNZ draw interest at the Official Cash Rate. For further details 
on the changes introduced see Frazer (2004), Guender and Rimer (2008), and Nield (2006). 8 
 
interest rates. This is a marked improvement over the CSB system with its diffuse policy 
signals. Because there was more uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy under 
the CSB system, the Reserve Bank was also far more activist in that it had to ensure that 
actual monetary conditions conformed to desired monetary conditions.   
 
IV. The Expectations Hypothesis under the Two Operating Procedures during the Low 
Inflation Period
8 
The impending adoption of the Official Cash Rate system, announced on February 8
th 1999, 
marks a clearly identifiable exogenous break in the operating procedure of the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand. Consequently, we deem it appropriate in our empirical analysis to 
distinguish between two sub-sample periods, the CSB system (1989:1-1999:2) and the OCR 
system (1993:3-2008:6).
9 
A.  Behavior of Interest Rates 
The Reserve Bank predicted that the adoption of the OCR system would lead to a substantial 
fall in interest rate volatility and hence to a more predictable course for monetary policy. In a 
statement released to financial markets on February 8
th, 1999, senior Reserve Bank 
economists wrote:  “[However], 90-day volatility is expected to fall [further] under the Cash 
Rate system. A less volatile 90-day rate, with most significant changes reflecting expectations 
about future monetary policy, will provide a clearer signal to investors and consumers 
making financial decisions (Archer, Brookes, and Reddell, p.57).  
Table 2 records the behavior of the 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, and 180-day bank bill rates in 
New Zealand over the whole sample period (1989:1-2008:6), the CSB period (1989:1-
1999:2), and the OCR period (1999:3-2008:6). It is evident that the standard deviation of 
changes in market interest rates fell across the board during the OCR period. Bills with a 
                                                           
8 CPI inflation in New Zealand fell from 9 percent in 1988 to 4 percent in 1989. Hence we chose January 1989 
as the beginning of the low-inflation period. The beginning of the sample period precedes the enactment of the 
Reserve Bank Act by almost a year. By January 1989, New Zealand had embarked on a steady course for 
monetary policy that emphasized the maintenance of price stability. In April of the preceding year, the Minister 
of Finance had declared “that in future monetary policy would be targeted at price stability,” (p. 252 in 
Monetary Policy and the Financial System). The Reserve Bank Act which officially defines price stability as the 
overriding goal of monetary policy was enacted in December 1989 and took effect on February 1
st, 1990.  
9 Some practitioners would prefer to rely on stability tests such as the Quandt-Andrews test to locate a 
breakpoint. But such tests can produce misleading results. For instance, the Quandt-Andrews test identifies 
1993:01 as a breakpoint in the current context. Closer examination of the term spreads reveals that at the 
beginning of January 1993 the Reserve Bank tightened monetary policy in response to a sharp depreciation of 
the NZ Dollar. As a result, the spreads turned sharply negative in January. By early February, the Reserve Bank 
had reversed its monetary policy action due to a marked drop in CPI inflation. Thus, an endogenous albeit 
temporary tightening of monetary policy is misconstrued by the Quandt-Andrews test as a breakpoint. 9 
 
maturity of up to 90 days experienced the most dramatic reduction in volatility. The standard 
deviations of 30-day, 60-day and 90-day bank bill rates decreased by more than 55 percent. 
The decrease in volatility during the OCR period was somewhat less for the 180-day bank 
bill rate at nearly 30 percent. Thus, the Reserve Bank’s prediction of a substantial decrease in 
fluctuations of market interest rates under the Official Cash Rate system is borne out by the 
data. Notice that there are no dramatic differences in the variability of changes in the bank 
bill rates during the OCR period.  
To test whether the predictability of interest rates depended on the operating procedure, we 
carry out a univariate forecasting exercise. The observed change in the short-term interest rate 
in period t+1 is regressed on its current period change and the current period change in the 
long-term interest rate.  The forecasting equations are estimated for the whole sample period 
as well as for the CSB sub-sample period and the OCR sub-sample period. The results of this 
exercise are reported in Table 3 for the 30-day/60-day rate scenario and in Table 4 for the 90-
day/180-day scenario.   
Inspection of the first two columns in both tables reveals that the forecasting equation 
explains movements in the short term interest rate much better during the OCR period than 
before. In Table 3, the adjusted R
2 rises almost seven-fold, from 0.08 during the CSB sub-
sample period to 0.53 during the OCR sub-sample period. Somewhat less dramatic 
improvements in the forecasting ability of the regression occur in the 90-day/180-day set-up.  
In Table 4, the adjusted R
2 increases markedly, almost doubling from 0.24 in the CSB sub-
sample period to 0.43 in the OCR sub-sample period.
10 All in all, these findings suggest that 
changes in the short-term interest rate became far more predictable during the OCR system.  
B.   Test of the Expectations Hypothesis on New Zealand Data 
If Mankiw and Miron’s claim that the success of the expectations hypothesis hinges critically 
on the predictability of short-term interest rates is correct, then one would expect the theory 
to receive more support in New Zealand during the OCR sub-sample period. After all, due to 
the shift from the CSB system to the OCR system, interest rates across the board became 
more predictable.  
                                                           
10 A similar picture emerges if one, first, decomposes the change in the observed interest rate  into the 
change explained by the regression   and the unexplained change (  and, second, compares 
the associated standard deviations across the subsample periods. For instance, in the 30-day/60-day set up, the 
standard deviation of   relative to the standard deviation of  is 0.0415/0.1323=0.3137 during the OCR 
period and 0.0161/0.4943=0.0325 during the CSB period Further details on the breakdown of total variation in 
short-term interest rates are available upon request from the authors. 10 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report the empirical findings for estimating equation (4). Table 5 shows the 
coefficient estimates of the regression and the associated test statistics for the 60-day/ 30-day 
term spread for the whole sample period and the two sub-sample periods. While the 
coefficient estimate on the term spread is positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level in all three regressions estimated, only the coefficient estimated for the OCR 
sub-sample period is close to the hypothesized value of two.
11 Indeed, a Wald test fails to 
reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient equals two for the OCR sub-sample period 
but not for the CSB sub-sample period. The p-value of the test is 0.315 for the former and 
0.05 for the latter. It is also evident that the 60-day/30-day term spread has far greater 
predictive content for the short rate during the OCR period than the CSB period or the whole 
sample period. The predictive power of the estimated regression rises more than eightfold, 
from 0.06 in the CSB sub-sample period to 0.53 in the OCR sub-sample period when short-
term interest rate variability was substantially lower than before the change in the operating 
procedure.
12  
The findings for the 180-day/90-day term spread appear in Table 6. Using bills with longer 
terms to maturity changes the results somewhat. The term spread has no predictive content 
for changes in the 90-day bank bill rate during the CSB sub-sample period. The adjusted R
2 
of 0.03 is abjectly low. In sharp contrast, the term spread predicts changes in the 90-day bank 
bill rate rather well in the OCR sub-sample period. The adjusted R
2 rises more than tenfold. 
However, the coefficient estimate of 0.79, while statistically significant at the one percent 
level, is much smaller than the hypothesized value of 2.  
C.  Sensitivity Analysis 
To check the robustness of our findings, we examined their sensitivity to shifting the date of 
the exogenous breakpoint in March 1999 backward. The announcement of the switch to (as 
opposed to the implementation of) the OCR regime was made in February 1999. Including 
February in the OCR sub-sample period actually increases the predictive ability of the 60-
day/30-day term spread slightly (Adj. R
2=0.54) and the estimated coefficient on the term 
spread increases to 1.91 (from 1.83). For the 180-day/90-day term spread regression, the 
adjusted R
2 also rises slightly from 0.40 to 0.41 and the coefficient estimate on the term 
                                                           
11 Attention focuses on the estimate of the slope coefficient. 
12 These results are thus immune to the criticism that the expectations hypothesis appears to be valid only in 
times of high variability of short-term interest rates, a point made by Kool and Thornton (2004)  in the context 
of the Mankiw and Miron (1986) study of the behavior of short term interest rates prior to the founding of the 
Fed. 11 
 
spread increases from 0.78 to 0.79. However, breakpoints dating back further produce much 
lower  coefficients  of  determination  and  lower  coefficient  estimates.
13  Thus, 1999:02 and 
1999:03, the date of the announcement and implementation, respectively, of the OCR regime 
represents the beginning of the sample interval during which the predictive ability of the term 
spread peaks. 
Following Kool and Thornton (2004), we  further  examined whether the support of the 
expectations hypothesis is confined to periods when the yield curve is inverted. Our results 
for the 30-day/60-day horizon suggest that this is not the case. Although the predictive power 
of the yield spread in the OCR period is greater when the yield curve is inverted 
 than when it is positively sloped ( , the coefficient on the yield spread 
is much closer to the hypothesized value of 2 when the yield curve is positively sloped (2.72) 
than when it is inverted (4.14). Both coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. For the 
90-day/180-day horizon, the predictive content of the  yield spread is also better when the 
yield curve is inverted  than when it is upward sloping  . 




In summary, solid evidence backing the validity of the expectations hypothesis in New 
Zealand exists at the very short end of the maturity spectrum (30-day/60-day) for the period 
starting in the first quarter of 1999 and ending mid-year in 2008. For financial instruments 
with a somewhat longer term to maturity (90-day/180-day), the expectations hypothesis fares 
worse. It bears repeating that the operating procedure of a central bank influences in no small 
measure whether the behavior of interest rates is consistent with the expectations hypothesis. 
The predictive content of the term spread improves markedly in the wake of the switch from 
a quantity-based to a price-based operating procedure in March 1999. The OCR system has 
made it easier for market participants to understand the day-to-day conduct of monetary 
policy. As a result, market interest rates have become more predictable, thereby contributing 
                                                           
13 Extending the OCR sub-sample period back to January 1999 causes the adjusted R
2 to drop by 20 percent in 
the 60-day/30-day term spread regression. Running the regression equation over the 1998:10-2008:6 period 
(adding 5 months to the OCR period) causes the coefficient of determination to drop to 0.33 (60-day/30-day 
term spread) and 0.29(180-day/90-day term spread). 12 
 
to the success of the expectations hypothesis in explaining the behavior of yields on very 
short-dated financial instruments in New Zealand. 
   13 
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Table 1: Average Daily Change in Short-Term Interest Rates (Basis Points) 
                                                                 90-day rate 
     1994-1999 (Jan)       1994-1996 (June)  1996 (July)-1999 (Jan) 
New Zealand             8              6.7               9.3 
Australia             3              3.4               2.6 
Canada            4.5              6.5               2.6 
United Kingdom            2.1              2.9               1.4 
United States            1.4              2.0               0.9 
Taken from Archer, Brookes, and Reddell (1999). 
 
 
Table 2: Standard Deviations of Changes in New Zealand Bank Bill Rates 
  1989:1 -1999:02  1999:03 - 2008:06  1989:1 - 2008:06 
30-day rate  0.4953  0.1323  0.3720 
60-day rate  0.4510  0.1340  0.3418 
90-day rate  0.4240  0.1376  0.3299 
180-day rate*  0.4223  0.1510  0.3124 
Note:  
1.  Monthly 30-day, 60-day, and 90-day rates were retrieved from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
website. * 180-day rates are available only from January 1991onward and were supplied by the 
Reserve Bank.  
2.  The raw yield xt on bank bills is converted into a compounded yield by the following formula: 
. 
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TABLE 3: Forecasting Equation 
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Notes: 1. The number of observations for the CSB, OCR and whole sample period are 120, 112, and 232, 
respectively.  
2. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively  
3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and rounded to four decimal places.  
4. All regression results are based on continuously compounded interest rates. Let the raw interest data be i. 
Then r = ln (1+ i/100) x 100. 
5. Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelations using the Newey –West procedure (1987).  
PERIOD  1989:01 - 1999:02  1999:03 - 2008:06  1989:01 - 2008:06 
Constant  -0.0400  0.0084  -0.0102 
  (0.0418)  (0.0078)  (0.0213) 
1 tt rr     -1.2681*  -1.1854***  -1.2304** 
  (0.6468)  (0.2788)  (0.5112) 
12 tt rr      -0.6578  -0.7781**  -0.6816** 
  (0.4322)  (0.3585)  (0.3283) 
23 tt rr      -0.4229  -0.2490  -0.4618 
  (0.5612)  (0.2220)  (0.4542) 
1 tt RR     1.7007**  1.6731***  1.6737*** 
  (0.7329)  (0.2788)  (0.5696) 
12 tt RR      0.5367  0.7591**  0.5804 
  (0.4848)  (0.2994)  (0.3625) 
23 tt RR      0.5379  0.4994*  0.6016 
  (0.6263)  (0.2661)  (0.5018) 
Adjusted R
2  0.08  0.53  0.14 
s.e.   0.4782  0.0908  0.3464 
LM test (p-value)  0.1531  0.2634  0.0155 16 
 
 
TABLE 4: Forecasting Equation 
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Note: see previous table. 
   
PERIOD  1991:01 - 1999:02  1999:03 - 2008:06  1991:01 - 2008:06 
Constant  -0.0234  0.0112  -0.0039 
  (0.0384)  (0.0101)  (0.0183) 
1 tt rr     -0.9893*  -0.2386  -0.6666* 
  (0.5809)  (0.1812)  (0.4019) 
12 tt rr      1.1524*  -0.4541**  0.5095 
  (0.6743)  (0.2161)  (0.4573) 
23 tt rr      -1.4399**  0.0715  -0.9142** 
  (0.5530)  (0.2397)  (0.3659) 
1 tt RR     1.5850**  0.6954***  1.2083*** 
  (0.6140)  (0.1991)  (0.4107) 
12 tt RR      -1.4918**  0.4377**  -0.7323 
  (0.7293)  (0.2121)  (0.4618) 
23 tt RR      1.7533***  0.1322  1.1676*** 
  (0.6116)  (0.2417)  (0.3930) 
Adjusted R
2  0.24  0.43  0.26 
s.e.   0.3931  0.1041  0.2786 
LM test (p-value)  0.4598  0.5998  0.1769 17 
 
TABLE 5: The Term Spread Equation 
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1.  The number of observations for the  CSB-, OCR- and whole sample period are 122, 112 and 234, 
respectively.  
2.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
3.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
4.  Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure. 
5.  All regression results are based on continuously compounded interest rates. Let the raw interest data be 
i. Then r = ln (1+ i/100) x 100. 
   
PERIOD  1989:1 - 1999:02  1999:3 - 2008:06  1989:1 - 2008:06  
Constant  -0.0946*  -0.04***   -0.0607** 
  (0.0544)  (0.0117)  (0.0304) 
tt Rr    1.219***  1.83***  1.395*** 
  (0.4262)  (0.1644)  (0.3104) 
Adjusted R
2  0.05  0.53  0.09 
D.W.  1.39  1.40  1.35 
s.e.  0.4817  0.0904  0.3548 18 
 
TABLE 6: The Term Spread Equation 
11 () t t t t t r r R r v         
t R  = 180-day rate   t r = 90-day rate 
 
Notes: 
1.  The  number  of  observations  for  the  CSB-,  OCR-  and  whole  sample  period  are  98,  112  and  210, 
respectively. See also notes to previous table. 
  
 
PERIOD  1991:01 - 1999:2  1999:3 - 2008:06  1991:01 – 2008:06 
Constant  -0.0815  -0.0334**  -0.0552* 
  (0.0582)  (0.0146)  (0.0312) 
Rt – rt  0.6224  0.7856***  0.7537*** 
  (0.3966)  (0.0923)  (0.1961) 
Adjusted R
2  0.03  0.40  0.08 
D.W.  1.19  1.29  1.18 
s.e.  0.4402  0.1065  0.3103 